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How to create own cryptocurrency?

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Today i whan to asq important question, How to create own cryptocurrency?

If someon cnow enithing plz share your info below ...

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1 hour ago, savas said:

Today i whan to asq important question, How to create own cryptocurrency?

If someon cnow enithing plz share your info below ...

we need like whole website , system , community, developers.

it's like to make whole new system using your own brain ...

we need to create like p2p cash system

new blockchain system

we can create it with some time and knowledge

here i am sharing one of best to create own system 

i will be in if you wanna start :P

 

 

Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash system

Abstract.

A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers. The network itself requires minimal structure. Messages are broadcast on a best effort basis, and nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the longest proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone.

1. Introduction

Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as trusted third parties to process electronic payments. While the system works well enough for most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust based model. Completely non-reversible transactions are not really possible, since financial institutions cannot avoid mediating disputes. The cost of mediation increases transaction costs, limiting the minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions, and there is a broader cost in the loss of ability to make non-reversible payments for nonreversible services. With the possibility of reversal, the need for trust spreads. Merchants must be wary of their customers, hassling them for more information than they would otherwise need. A certain percentage of fraud is accepted as unavoidable. These costs and payment uncertainties can be avoided in person by using physical currency, but no mechanism exists to make payments over a communications channel without a trusted party. What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party. Transactions that are computationally impractical to reverse would protect sellers from fraud, and routine escrow mechanisms could easily be implemented to protect buyers. In this paper, we propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server to generate computational proof of the chronological order of transactions. The system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes. 1

2. Transactions

We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Each owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner and adding these to the end of the coin. A payee can verify the signatures to verify the chain of ownership. The problem of course is the payee can't verify that one of the owners did not double-spend the coin. A common solution is to introduce a trusted central authority, or mint, that checks every transaction for double spending. After each transaction, the coin must be returned to the mint to issue a new coin, and only coins issued directly from the mint are trusted not to be double-spent. The problem with this solution is that the fate of the entire money system depends on the company running the mint, with every transaction having to go through them, just like a bank. We need a way for the payee to know that the previous owners did not sign any earlier transactions. For our purposes, the earliest transaction is the one that counts, so we don't care about later attempts to double-spend. The only way to confirm the absence of a transaction is to be aware of all transactions. In the mint based model, the mint was aware of all transactions and decided which arrived first. To accomplish this without a trusted party, transactions must be publicly announced [1], and we need a system for participants to agree on a single history of the order in which they were received. The payee needs proof that at the time of each transaction, the majority of nodes agreed it was the first received.

3. Timestamp Server

The solution we propose begins with a timestamp server. A timestamp server works by taking a hash of a block of items to be timestamped and widely publishing the hash, such as in a newspaper or Usenet post [2-5]. The timestamp proves that the data must have existed at the time, obviously, in order to get into the hash. Each timestamp includes the previous timestamp in its hash, forming a chain, with each additional timestamp reinforcing the ones before it. 2 Block Item Item ... Hash Block Item Item ... Hash Transaction Owner 1's Public Key Owner 0's Signature Hash Transaction Owner 2's Public Key Owner 1's Signature Hash Verify Transaction Owner 3's Public Key Owner 2's Signature Hash Verify Owner 2's Private Key Owner 1's Private Key Sign Sign Owner 3's Private Key

4. Proof-of-Work

To implement a distributed timestamp server on a peer-to-peer basis, we will need to use a proofof-work system similar to Adam Back's Hashcash [6], rather than newspaper or Usenet posts. The proof-of-work involves scanning for a value that when hashed, such as with SHA-256, the hash begins with a number of zero bits. The average work required is exponential in the number of zero bits required and can be verified by executing a single hash. For our timestamp network, we implement the proof-of-work by incrementing a nonce in the block until a value is found that gives the block's hash the required zero bits. Once the CPU effort has been expended to make it satisfy the proof-of-work, the block cannot be changed without redoing the work. As later blocks are chained after it, the work to change the block would include redoing all the blocks after it. The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining representation in majority decision making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it could be subverted by anyone able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote. The majority decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest proof-of-work effort invested in it. If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, an attacker would have to redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and then catch up with and surpass the work of the honest nodes. We will show later that the probability of a slower attacker catching up diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added. To compensate for increasing hardware speed and varying interest in running nodes over time, the proof-of-work difficulty is determined by a moving average targeting an average number of blocks per hour. If they're generated too fast, the difficulty increases.

5. Network

The steps to run the network are as follows:

1) New transactions are broadcast to all nodes.

2) Each node collects new transactions into a block.

3) Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block.

4) When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes.

5) Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already spent.

6) Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next block in the chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previous hash.

Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the correct one and will keep working on extending it. If two nodes broadcast different versions of the next block simultaneously, some nodes may receive one or the other first. In that case, they work on the first one they received, but save the other branch in case it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when the next proofof-work is found and one branch becomes longer; the nodes that were working on the other branch will then switch to the longer one. 3 Block Prev Hash Nonce Tx Tx ... Block Prev Hash Nonce Tx Tx ... New transaction broadcasts do not necessarily need to reach all nodes. As long as they reach many nodes, they will get into a block before long. Block broadcasts are also tolerant of dropped messages. If a node does not receive a block, it will request it when it receives the next block and realizes it missed one.

6. Incentive

By convention, the first transaction in a block is a special transaction that starts a new coin owned by the creator of the block. This adds an incentive for nodes to support the network, and provides a way to initially distribute coins into circulation, since there is no central authority to issue them. The steady addition of a constant of amount of new coins is analogous to gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation. In our case, it is CPU time and electricity that is expended. The incentive can also be funded with transaction fees. If the output value of a transaction is less than its input value, the difference is a transaction fee that is added to the incentive value of the block containing the transaction. Once a predetermined number of coins have entered circulation, the incentive can transition entirely to transaction fees and be completely inflation free. The incentive may help encourage nodes to stay honest. If a greedy attacker is able to assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.

7. Reclaiming Disk Space

Once the latest transaction in a coin is buried under enough blocks, the spent transactions before it can be discarded to save disk space. To facilitate this without breaking the block's hash, transactions are hashed in a Merkle Tree [7][2][5], with only the root included in the block's hash. Old blocks can then be compacted by stubbing off branches of the tree. The interior hashes do not need to be stored. A block header with no transactions would be about 80 bytes. If we suppose blocks are generated every 10 minutes, 80 bytes * 6 * 24 * 365 = 4.2MB per year. With computer systems typically selling with 2GB of RAM as of 2008, and Moore's Law predicting current growth of 1.2GB per year, storage should not be a problem even if the block headers must be kept in memory. 4 Block Block Block Header (Block Hash) Prev Hash Nonce Hash01 Hash0 Hash1 Hash2 Hash3 Hash23 Root Hash Hash01 Hash2 Tx3 Hash23 Block Header (Block Hash) Root Hash Transactions Hashed in a Merkle Tree After Pruning Tx0-2 from the Block Prev Hash Nonce Hash3 Tx0 Tx1 Tx2 Tx3

8. Simplified Payment Verification

It is possible to verify payments without running a full network node. A user only needs to keep a copy of the block headers of the longest proof-of-work chain, which he can get by querying network nodes until he's convinced he has the longest chain, and obtain the Merkle branch linking the transaction to the block it's timestamped in. He can't check the transaction for himself, but by linking it to a place in the chain, he can see that a network node has accepted it, and blocks added after it further confirm the network has accepted it. As such, the verification is reliable as long as honest nodes control the network, but is more vulnerable if the network is overpowered by an attacker. While network nodes can verify transactions for themselves, the simplified method can be fooled by an attacker's fabricated transactions for as long as the attacker can continue to overpower the network. One strategy to protect against this would be to accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid block, prompting the user's software to download the full block and alerted transactions to confirm the inconsistency. Businesses that receive frequent payments will probably still want to run their own nodes for more independent security and quicker verification.

9. Combining and Splitting Value

Although it would be possible to handle coins individually, it would be unwieldy to make a separate transaction for every cent in a transfer. To allow value to be split and combined, transactions contain multiple inputs and outputs. Normally there will be either a single input from a larger previous transaction or multiple inputs combining smaller amounts, and at most two outputs: one for the payment, and one returning the change, if any, back to the sender. It should be noted that fan-out, where a transaction depends on several transactions, and those transactions depend on many more, is not a problem here. There is never the need to extract a complete standalone copy of a transaction's history. 5 Transaction In ... In Out ... Hash01 Hash2 Hash3 Hash23 Block Header Merkle Root Prev Hash Nonce Block Header Merkle Root Prev Hash Nonce Block Header Merkle Root Prev Hash Nonce Merkle Branch for Tx3 Longest Proof-of-Work Chain Tx3

10. Privacy

The traditional banking model achieves a level of privacy by limiting access to information to the parties involved and the trusted third party. The necessity to announce all transactions publicly precludes this method, but privacy can still be maintained by breaking the flow of information in another place: by keeping public keys anonymous. The public can see that someone is sending an amount to someone else, but without information linking the transaction to anyone. This is similar to the level of information released by stock exchanges, where the time and size of individual trades, the "tape", is made public, but without telling who the parties were. As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them from being linked to a common owner. Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner. The risk is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to the same owner.

11. Calculations

We consider the scenario of an attacker trying to generate an alternate chain faster than the honest chain. Even if this is accomplished, it does not throw the system open to arbitrary changes, such as creating value out of thin air or taking money that never belonged to the attacker. Nodes are not going to accept an invalid transaction as payment, and honest nodes will never accept a block containing them. An attacker can only try to change one of his own transactions to take back money he recently spent. The race between the honest chain and an attacker chain can be characterized as a Binomial Random Walk. The success event is the honest chain being extended by one block, increasing its lead by +1, and the failure event is the attacker's chain being extended by one block, reducing the gap by -1. The probability of an attacker catching up from a given deficit is analogous to a Gambler's Ruin problem. Suppose a gambler with unlimited credit starts at a deficit and plays potentially an infinite number of trials to try to reach breakeven. We can calculate the probability he ever reaches breakeven, or that an attacker ever catches up with the honest chain, as follows [8]: p = probability an honest node finds the next block q = probability the attacker finds the next block qz = probability the attacker will ever catch up from z blocks behind qz={ 1 if p≤q q/ p z if pq} 6 Identities Transactions Trusted Third Party Counterparty Public Identities Transactions Public New Privacy Model Traditional Privacy Model Given our assumption that p > q, the probability drops exponentially as the number of blocks the attacker has to catch up with increases. With the odds against him, if he doesn't make a lucky lunge forward early on, his chances become vanishingly small as he falls further behind. We now consider how long the recipient of a new transaction needs to wait before being sufficiently certain the sender can't change the transaction. We assume the sender is an attacker who wants to make the recipient believe he paid him for a while, then switch it to pay back to himself after some time has passed. The receiver will be alerted when that happens, but the sender hopes it will be too late. The receiver generates a new key pair and gives the public key to the sender shortly before signing. This prevents the sender from preparing a chain of blocks ahead of time by working on it continuously until he is lucky enough to get far enough ahead, then executing the transaction at that moment. Once the transaction is sent, the dishonest sender starts working in secret on a parallel chain containing an alternate version of his transaction. The recipient waits until the transaction has been added to a block and z blocks have been linked after it. He doesn't know the exact amount of progress the attacker has made, but assuming the honest blocks took the average expected time per block, the attacker's potential progress will be a Poisson distribution with expected value: =z q p To get the probability the attacker could still catch up now, we multiply the Poisson density for each amount of progress he could have made by the probability he could catch up from that point:

∑ k=0 ∞  k e − k! ⋅{ q/ p z−k  if k≤z 1 if kz}

Rearranging to avoid summing the infinite tail of the distribution...

1−∑ k=0 z  k e − k! 1−q/ p z−k  

Converting to C code...

#include

double AttackerSuccessProbability(double q, int z)

{

double p = 1.0 - q;

double lambda = z * (q / p); double sum = 1.0;

int i, k

for (k = 0; k <= z; k++) { double poisson = exp(-lambda);

for (i = 1; i <= k; i++)

poisson *= lambda / i;

sum -= poisson * (1 - pow(q / p, z - k));

}

return sum;

}  

Running some results, we can see the probability drop off exponentially with

z. q=0.1

z=0 P=1.0000000

z=1 P=0.2045873

z=2 P=0.0509779

z=3 P=0.0131722

z=4 P=0.0034552

z=5 P=0.0009137

z=6 P=0.0002428

z=7 P=0.0000647

z=8 P=0.0000173

z=9 P=0.0000046

z=10 P=0.0000012

q=0.3 z=0

P=1.0000000

z=5 P=0.1773523

z=10 P=0.0416605

z=15 P=0.0101008

z=20 P=0.0024804

z=25 P=0.0006132

z=30 P=0.0001522

z=35 P=0.0000379

z=40 P=0.0000095

z=45 P=0.0000024

z=50 P=0.0000006

Solving for P less than 0.1%...

P < 0.001

q=0.10 z=5

q=0.15 z=8

q=0.20 z=11

q=0.25 z=15

q=0.30 z=24

q=0.35 z=41

q=0.40 z=89

q=0.45 z=340

12.

Conclusion We have proposed a system for electronic transactions without relying on trust. We started with the usual framework of coins made from digital signatures, which provides strong control of ownership, but is incomplete without a way to prevent double-spending. To solve this, we proposed a peer-to-peer network using proof-of-work to record a public history of transactions that quickly becomes computationally impractical for an attacker to change if honest nodes control a majority of CPU power. The network is robust in its unstructured simplicity. Nodes work all at once with little coordination. They do not need to be identified, since messages are not routed to any particular place and only need to be delivered on a best effort basis. Nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone. They vote with their CPU power, expressing their acceptance of valid blocks by working on extending them and rejecting invalid blocks by refusing to work on them. Any needed rules and incentives can be enforced with this consensus mechanism. 8 References [1] W. Dai, "b-money," http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt, 1998. [2] H. Massias, X.S. Avila, and J.-J. Quisquater, "Design of a secure timestamping service with minimal trust requirements," In 20th Symposium on Information Theory in the Benelux, May 1999. [3] S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "How to time-stamp a digital document," In Journal of Cryptology, vol 3, no 2, pages 99-111, 1991. [4] D. Bayer, S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "Improving the efficiency and reliability of digital time-stamping," In Sequences II: Methods in Communication, Security and Computer Science, pages 329-334, 1993. [5] S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "Secure names for bit-strings," In Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 28-35, April 1997. [6] A. Back, "Hashcash - a denial of service counter-measure," http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf, 2002. [7] R.C. Merkle, "Protocols for public key cryptosystems," In Proc. 1980 Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE Computer Society, pages 122-133, April 1980. [8] W. Feller, "An introduction to probability theory and its applications," 1957. 9

 

another more info ....

Guild 2

 

1. Use Community To Nurture Currency

When you think about creating a new digital currency it’s easy to assume the first step would be to begin coding your coin, but that’s the wrong place to start, according to Chris Ellis, a London entrepreneur and a community activist at Feathercoin.

“The first step is to find a community and build a currency around them rather than building a currency and expecting everyone to show up,” Ellis says. “It has to be sensitive to their needs and be relevant to their cultural heritage and background.”

Feathercoin was created by Peter Bushnell in April 2013. Bushnell left his job as head of IT at Oxford University’s Brasenose College because he wanted to start his own currency that put people at the center. This was in response to what he saw as a lack of community involvement and inclusiveness by the existing cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, on the popular cryptocurrency site bitcointalk.org.

Though he had not met Bushnell at the time, Ellis, who had been actively promoting and educating people on cryptocurrencies since last March, shared the sense of alienation and seclusion found on Bitcoin forums.

“These forums were very tech focused and not very welcoming to newcomers or minority groups which are often served better by smaller teams,” Ellis says. “The forums did not make it easy for people to get involved in the development of the coin. Many people on these forums take a backseat and speculate on the price rather than actively getting involved.”

Ellis found the cryptocurrency community activism he was looking for in Feathercoin, whose technical development he says benefits greatly from its community activism approach.

“For Feathercoin we were a group of crypto enthusiasts, some of whom were new to the scene but who felt shut out from the rest of the space,” Ellis says. Everyone at Feathercoin feels it’s important to demonstrate how a devoted group of people can establish a stable currency, he says. By working together a community of dedicated crypto enthusiasts are much better able to find and address vulnerabilities and security threats, like the 51% attack, which the community of coders at Feathercoin have successfully built protections against.

Building such protections and nurturing the development of your currency give your coin legitimacy and trust in the eyes of the public, something that is hard to do if those involved in the currency are passive spectators looking out for their own interests.

2. Code For The Long Run

Surprisingly, every single currency developer I spoke with said the same thing: Coding your cryptocurrency is usually the least time-intensive part of the process. That’s because virtually every cryptocurrency on the market today is based on the open source code of Bitcoin or Litecoin that is available on GitHub.

“The creation itself does not take long. It is maybe only a day,” says Peter Otterbach, one of the creators of Coino, which bills itself as the fastest cryptocurrency on the market with a maximum transaction time of only 50 seconds. “To start coding you just need to know about C++ to build your own features in it.”

The length of time could be a little longer than a day, however, according to Kolin Evans, developer of the Quark cryptocurrency. “In coding the most complex steps may be related to how complex you plan to have the individual parameters of the blockchain,” Evans says. “For example, many currencies just use the Litecoin code and copy it, but with Quark there was a whole new Hash algorithm––that is to say, it’s separate from both Bitcoin and Litecoin––so this aspect if you were to change it would certainly be the most difficult.” And time consuming. In this case coding a cryptocurrency could take months. However, Evans notes that if a developer is just reusing code from GitHub and changing some simple parameters, that’s something a competent coder could do in “literally 30 minutes.”

But just because anyone with some C++ skills can make their own cryptocurrency doesn’t mean that there will be as many currencies as, say, iOS apps one day. “Feathercoin is in fact a fork of Litecoin,” says Ellis. “It began with the minimum number of parameter changes because we felt the most important feature of a currency was survivability.”

However, the Feathcoin team noticed that a few of the currencies that came before didn’t last very long because they included a novel feature set which would gain short-term speculative hype but then the team often weren’t able to follow through on the stewardship of the project longer term and the project would fail. In other words, the developers of those coins that failed probably wanted to make some cheddar on some quick coin creation and didn’t want to work at developing the currency for the long run–something which doomed them from the start.

“You have a duty of care at the development end in terms of bug fixing and ensuring the promise made at launch but you also have a duty to educate people of the risks and give them what they need to secure their wealth,” Ellis says. If you can’t do that, no one is going to stick around to use your coin, and the mining of it will drop off as quickly as downloads did of the first Doodle Jump knockoffs.

3. Get Miners Onboard

Once you’ve developed your coin you need to spread the word so people start mining it, which raises awareness of its existence and hopefully begins to gain some value in the eyes of its miners and users. This is where makers of cryptocurrencies need to stop thinking like coders and instead look into how human beings put trust (and value) in things.

“A good start is half the way there and so this involves building trust, expressing your vision and intentions to miners, who have the hardware you need, and getting them on board with the opportunity ahead,” Feathercoin’s Ellis explains. “You have to be honest and respect people’s expectations and their tolerance of risk, which many people overestimate.

“Overselling your coin will backfire. Including novel feature sets just to try and stand out will not work either. The market is there to test your grit and determination. You need a group of loyal miners committed to the cause who will process your payments even during slumps in price because they believe in the eventual outcome. It’s about good communication and team building.

“Many coins have failed because they undervalue the ‘soft stuff.’ They think that throwing technology at a problem will make it disappear. Central banks think throwing money at problems does the same; the world has never worked this way. You have to be good at knowing what work needs to be done and be prepared to do the jobs nobody else wants to do.”

4. Know Your Merchants

Let’s says you’ve made it this far. You’ve conceptualized a good cryptocurrency and brought the right team together to code and nurture it along its way. You’ve spread the news around the cryptocurrency forums and there’s a healthy dose of miners actively working to grow your currency. The next step is marketing your currency so all the people mining it have a place to spend it. This is no small feat. After all, you need to convince individuals and merchants that these digital bits you’ve created hold value and can be traded for things, just like traditional, trusted money.

“It’s a process of confidence building,” Ellis says. “It takes good stewardship and time to work out what you really believe and stand for. People will buy in to your motives more than your actions, so once you feel confident you then have to start talking about your currency to friends, merchants, on Internet forums and on social media.”

The people behind Coino agree. “To start the marketing you need to find the exact target group,” Peter Otterbach says. “At first you can just start at the cryptocurrency market itself because the people there know about coins and you see the first reactions. After that it gets more difficult. You need to convince people who mostly don’t even know what a cryptocurrency is, so you have to get the currency accepted as a payment solution in online shops to get their attention.”

“I would add it’s not just about educating them with facts,” Ellis notes, “it’s about inspiring them to learn and discover the advantages for themselves. Money is a ledger, it is a tool that people will use as a way of achieving their goals and satisfying their needs. Understanding that will take you a long way in your marketing efforts.”

Ellis says that merchant adoption is similar to miner adoption, it’s just a matter of understanding their different outlooks. “Different stakeholder, same rules. The difference is that miners have a speculative sentiment and merchants are conservative.” He notes that merchants have three principal aims: to make money, to save money, and to increase their awareness. “If you can bring them customers and increase their sales while reducing their payment fees, the rest is a matter of persistence and making it as easy as possible to get them started.”

5. Global Acceptance Is Not a Step

The last step in your cryptocurrency journey is, according to pundits and conventional wisdom, world domination by your coin. But given that in over 5,000 years no single currency has dominated the globe, it’s very unlikely–no matter what Silicon Valley Bitcoin enthusiasts say–that any one cryptocurrency ever will.

Besides, global cryptocurrency domination “doesn’t have to be the goal,” Ellis says. “Currencies can be local, indeed we think of Feathercoin as a local currency that can serve a global market.”

And therein may lie the true market for the burgeoning field of cryptocurrency: hyper-local currencies for certain neighborhoods, cities, events, venues, and groups of people that are built around a community of like-minded consumers allowing them to trade freely, quickly, and securely for goods and services that are important in their lives instead of having to rely on the central banks and larger markets to tell them what arbitrary item, be it a copper coin or a plastic dollar, holds value.

Indeed, in a market where cryptocurrency use is defined by neighborhood boundaries or group memberships there is no need for any one cryptocurrency to “win.” There’s room for them all–except maybe the ones with memes.

Edited by ADh

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